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FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE: FOURTH CIRCUIT
ADOPTS "SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES" AS "GOOD CAUSE"
TEST FOR RULE 34
RULE 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits the in-
spection of documents in the possession of an opposing party upon a
showing of "good cause."' The Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit recently held in Guilford National Bank v. Southern Ry.2 that
"good cause" requires some specific showing of "special circumstances"
before the inspection of witness statements will be allowed.
The discovery issue in Guilford arose out of a wrongful death
action based on a crossing collision between a train and an automobile.
Within six days after the accident, the defendant Southern Railway's
claim agent obtained written statements from witnesses, including the
train crew. The attorney for the plaintiff estate began to investigate
by the sixth day. Although he interviewed some witnesses, he did not
interview any of the train crew. In no instance did he take written
statements.' A year later he attempted to obtain through rule 34 the
written statements in Southern's possession. The trial court ordered
the production of the statements on the grounds that they were "rele-
vant" to the controversy, unique and irreplaceable by deposition, and in
'The rule provides: "Upon motion of any party showing good cause therefor and
upon notice to all other parties, and subject to the provisions of Rule 3 o(b), the
court in which an action is pending may (i) order any party to produce and permit
the inspection and copying or photographing, by or on behalf of the moving party,
of any designated documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects,
or tangible things, not privileged, which constitute or contain evidence relating to any
of the matters within the scope of the examination permitted by Rule 26(b) and
which are in his possession, custody, or control... 21
Practical considerations, depending on the particular facts of each case, usually
determine "good cause." See 4 MOORE, FEDERAL PRAcrscE 134.08, at 2449-51
(2d ed. 1950) [hereinafter cited as MOORE]. Since the term "good cause" lacks a
particular frame of reference, the judge really makes a "comparative evaluation of com-
peting claims of need and prejudice." United Air Lines, Inc. v. United States, 26
F.R.D. 213, 217 (D. Del. 196o). But a court is under no duty to search out good
cause3 therefore, the motion should be accompanied by an affidavit setting forth facts
that establish the need for inspection. 4 MOORE 7 34.o7 at 2442-43.
2297 F.zd 92x (4 th Cir. 1962).
"Brief for Appellant, pp. Ax 3-4-.
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Southern's exclusive possession. Southern refused to comply and was
held in contempt.5
The Court of Appeals reversed the contempt order, holding that
"relevancy" was not equivalent to "good cause" and that the additional
circumstances shown by the plaintiff were insufficient to justify the
discovery order." According to the court, opportunities to obtain by
deposition, interrogatories, or mutual exchange the "substance" of the
information in Southern's statements apparently still existed. The
court was also impressed by the past opportunities of the plaintiff's
attorney to obtain written statements.7 It distinguished Guilford from
'24 F.R.D. 493 (M.D.N.C. i96o). The trial court also felt that Southern would
not be materially prejudiced by making the disclosure because a North Carolina Middle
District court rule required that the names of witnesses and the "nature of their
testimony" had to be disclosed in advance of trial. Id. at Soo. This rule provides
that "attorneys for each of the parties shall furnish opposing counsel with the written
list of the names and addresses of all witnesses then known, together with a brief
statement of what counsel proposes to establish by the testimony of each witness .... .
M.D.N.C.R. zz(g)(4), 5 FED. RULES SERV. 2d, Local Court Rules 727 (1962).
Furthermore, the trial judge believed that his decision was consistent with previous
Fourth Circuit holdings in New York Cent. R.R. v. Carr, 251 F.2d 433 ( 4.th Cir.
x957) and Tiedman v. American Pigment Corp., 253 F.2d 803 (4th Cir. 1958). The
Carr case affirmed an order to produce the plaintiff's own statement given to a claim
agent shortly after an accident while the plaintiff was still hospitalized and unrepre-
sented by counsel on the ground that it would only be fair to a "co-operative employee,"
whose memory has dimmed in the intervening months. In Tiedman the court
affirmed the denial of a motion to inspect all books, records and correspondence per-
taining to a contract claim because the plaintiff's ability to prepare his case had not
been adversely affected and he had made no effort to show "good cause." Both of
these cases are factually distinguishable from Guilford. In Tiedman, as in Guilford,
however, it was the moving party who had to show that his ability to prepare his
case would be unfairly prejudiced. Under some other discovery device, such as rule
26, the opposing party would have to show that the discovery of materials in his
possession would be economically and prejudicially burdensome. In this sense, Guilford
is no departure from Tiedsman, although some of the language in Tiedman was not as
liberal as it appeared to be.
' Since the contempt order was a "Cfinal"l order, it could be appealed. See 4.
MOORE 26.3713], at 1215 5 Developments in the Law--Discovery, 74 HARV. L. REV.
940, 996 (196i) [hereinafter cited as Developments].
' In comparing rule 34 with the other discovery rules, the court stated that "there
must be a greater showing of need under Rules 34 and 35 than under other discovery
rules" and noted that the Supreme Court did not act on the recommendation of the
Advisory Committee to delete "good cause" from rule 34. The court distinguished
cases relied on by the district court that involved "indispensable" business records.
Thus the court was "not prepared to depart from the explicit language of Rule 34
when viewed in the context of the entire discovery section." 297 F.2d at 923-25.
Accord, Hauger v. Chicago, R.I. & P.R.R., 216 F.2d Soi (7 th Cir. 1954) i McSparren
v. Bethlehem-Cuba Iron Mines Co., 26 F.R.D. 619 (E.D. Pa. x96o).
7"Absent circumstances to the contrary, there is no reason to suppose that an
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Animilar cases in which the plaintiff had .no .actual opportunity to in-
vestigate until weeks or months after the accident. Implicit in the
court's. holding was an attempt to encourage independent, diligent
investigation by both parties' and to discourage any unfair use of rule
"34, a. potentially "harassing' weapon.'
The Fourth Circuit's decision in Guilford embodied a generally
accepted, but conservative, discovery-limiting attitude toward rule 34.10
The trial court, on the other hand, took a more liberal attitude, striving
to maximize pre-trial disclosure." Both courts were concerned, how-
-ever, with a basic "good cause" question: whether the desired informa-
tion was available by some means other than actual inspection. 2 The
proper answer varies with the nature of the desired information, its
importance to issues in the case, and the extent to which an independent
interview of a witness six days, or even nine days, after the accident is any less reliable
than a statement taken on the day following the accident [referring to interviews with
witnesses other than the train crew; see note 3 supra] . . . . The case might be
different if the plaintiff had taken depositions of the employee-witnesses, or at least
interviewed them. . . ." 297 F.zd at 926. For a similar reaction, see Wilson v.
David, zx F.R.D. 217 (W.D. Mich. 1957) (party represented by counsel within two
days after accident had same ability to make complete investigation).
' "The plaintiff cannot be permitted to rely entirely upon the defendant's efforts ....
'Discovery was hardly intended to enable a learned profession to perform its functions
either without wits or on wits borrowed from the adversary [Hickman v. Taylor, 329
U.S. 495, S16 (x94.7) (Jackson, J., concurring)]. . . . [C]ounsel's natural desire
to learn the details of his adversary's preparation for trial, to take advantage of his
adversary's industry in seeking out and interviewing prospective witnesses, to help
prepare himself to examine witnesses or to make sure that he had overlooked nothing
are certainly not such special circumstances .... '[Alltmont v. United States, 177 F.zd
971, .978 (3d Cir. 1949)]." 297 F.2d at 926-27. But see Taine, Discovery of Trial
Preparation in the Federal Courts, 5o COLUM. L. REV. xo26, 5o38 (.950).
'![C]ompelling the production of documents under Rule 34 can be extremely
harassing. Use of the weapons which this rule forges should not be permitted with-
out more than the easily satisfied test of relevancy." 297 F.zd at 924. But see Frost,
Ascertainment of Truth by Discovery, 28 F.R.D. 89, 93 (1961) (discovery tools
described as "potent weapons in the arsenal of the attorney in search of truth").
"Accord, Hauger v. Chicago, R.I. & P.R.R., z16 F.2d 5oi (7 th Cir. 1954);
Williams v. Continental Oil Co., 215 F.2d 4 (ioth Cir. 1954); Alltmont v. United
.States, 177 F.zd 971 ( 3 d Cir. 1949) , cert. denied, 339 U.S. 967 (595o); Martin v.
Capital Transit Co., 17o F.2d 81x (D.C. Cir. 1948); Margeson v. Boston & M.R.R.,
x6 F.R.D. 200 (D. Mass. 1954 ) .
"Accord, Crowe v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 29 F.R.D. 148 (E.D. Mich. 196t);
United Air Lines, Inc. v. United States, 186 F. Supp. 824 (D. Del. 196o ) ; Connecticut
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Shields, 17 F.R.D. 273 (S.D.N.Y. t9S5).
"1 See 2A BARRON & HOLTZOFF, FEWERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 796, at 424
(rev. ed. 196t) [hereinafter cited as BARRON & HoLIzoFF]; 4 MOORE 134.08, at
2454.
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effort had or could successfully have been made to obtain this informa-
tion by some other means. Accordingly, courts usually find "good
cause" for the production of business records and accident reports,
recognizing that these documents usually contain exclusive, technical
information indispensable to basic issues in the case and irreplaceable by
independent effort.'3
Conflicting attitudes toward the scope of rule 34 exist, however,
as to the production of witness statements. 4 The Supreme Court in
Hickman v. Taylor"5 brought this conflict to the surface by denying
the production of witness statements taken by an attorney in the course
of his trial preparation on the ground that the moving party failed to
show any "necessity" for the opposing attorney's "work product.""
Most courts of appeals have extended this "necessity" test to non-
work-product statements,17 apparently on the theory that the underlying
policy choice in Hickman, to protect the privacy of the attorney's files
and to preserve an efficient adversary system, also applied to these
non-work-product statements.'8
" Business records: See, e.g., Bell v. Commercial Ins. Co., z8o F.2d 514 ( 3d Cir.
196o); Roebling v. Anderson, 257 F.zd 615 (D.C. Cir. 1958) Roth v. Bird, 239
F.zd 257 (sth Cir. 1956); Gulf Constr. Co. v. St. Joe Paper Co., 24 F.R.D. 411
(S.D. Tex. 1959) Houdry Process Corp. v. Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co., 24 F.R.D.
58 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
Accident reports and photographs: See, e.g., Marks v. Gas Serv. Co., 168 F. Supp.
487 (W.D. Mo. 1958); Supine v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 21 F.R.D. 42
(E.D.N.Y. [1957]) ; United States v. Great No. Ry., is F.R.D. 357 (N.D. Cal. x955);
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Little Rock Basket Co., 14 F.R.D. 383 (E.D. Ark. 1953).
", Compare Crowe v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 29 F.R.D. 148 (E.D. Mich. 1961)'and
De Bruce v. Pennsylvania R.R., 6 F.R.D. 403 (E.D. Pa. 194-7), with Alltmont v.
United States, 177 F.2d 971 (3d Cir. x949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 967 (195o) and
Margeson v. Boston & M.R.R., 16 F.R.D. 200 (D. Mass. 1954). See Kaufman, Judicial
Control Over Discovery, 28 F.R.D. xsi, *15-x6, 125 (I961); Taine, supra note 8, at
1027. See generally FRANK, CouRTs ON TRIAL 93-94 (1949) ; Tolman, Discovery Under
the Federal Rules: Production of Documents and the Work Product of the Lawyer, 58
COLUM. L. REv. 498 (958); Annot., 73 A.L.R.zd 12 (i96o).
2r 329 U.S. 495 (1947)-
6 Id. at 5o8-o9. For a discussion of the differing views on the "work product"
doctrine, see Developments, supra note 5, at 1027-33. See also McCORMICK, EVI-
DENCE § 100 (1gs4-
Although Hickman became the starting point for a "far-reaching [liberalizing]
adjustment process concerning the attitude of the courts with respect to discovery... "
Taine, supra note 8, at 1035, the case can still be correctly labeled as a "veritable
Pandora's Box!" Viront v. Wheeling & L.E.Ry., io F.R.D. 45, 47 (N.D. Ohio
1950). See generally, 4 MOORE 26.23[8].
27See 2A BARRON & HOLTOFF § 796, at 419; 4 MOORE 26.23[8], at 1132.
" See, e.g., Alltmont v. United States, 177 F.2d 971, 976 ( 3 d Cir. 1949) cert.
Vol. i96z: 57 z ]
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Some courts, on the other hand, have tried to resist the extension
of the Hickman doctrine, contending that a less stringent test of "good
cause" should suffice when a non-work-product statement is desired.1"
Statements taken by claim agents, for example, have been viewed as
more similar to business records, compiled in the "ordinary course of
business," than to lawyers' pre-trial preparations. 0 Since there is no
invasion of an attorney's personal impressions, the controlling policy
has been to facilitate pre-trial disclosure, minimize unfair surprise, and
to promote expeditious settlement.21  Accordingly, such witness state-
ments taken near the time of the accident have been regarded as unique
and irreplaceable by deposition. Since the purpose of inspection is
denied, 339 U.S. 967 (195o); Wilson v. David, 2x F.R.D. 217, 220 (W.D. Mich.
1957). One commentator has said this extension is in accord with the Hickman
rationale, because non-lawyers and experts also perform "vital functions in litigation";
a showing of necessity to inspect their work should also be required. Taine, supra
note 8, at 1051-52. Accordingly, whether the statements were made in anticipation of
or in preparation for litigation would be more important than the occupation of the
investigator. See Comment, 36 IND. L.J. x86, 19o (196i).
1 See, e.g., Atlantic Greyhound Corp. v. Lauritzen, 182 F.2d 540, 542 (6th Cir.
1950); Scourtes v. Fred W. Albrecht Grocery Co., 15 F.R.D. 55, 58 (N.D. Ohio 1953).
That something less than a showing of necessity is required when one seeks the im-
pressions of witnesses can be supported by language in Hickman. See Hickman v.
Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511-12 (1947). The Hickman case has been factually dis-
tinguished and found inapplicable to non-lawyer situations where discovery would
otherwise be restricted. 4 MooRE 126.23[8], at 1132-136.
A later Supreme Court case, United States v. Procter & Gamble, 356 U.S. 677
(1958), which denied the use of grand jury material in a civil antitrust suit, provided
clues as to the scope of Hickman as then interpreted. Writing for the majority, Mr.
Justice Douglas said, "[T]ogether with pre-trial procedures [discovery] makes a trial
less a game of blindman's buff and more a fair contest with the basic issues and facts
disclosed to the fullest practicable extent . . . . Only strong public policies weigh
against disclosure. They were present in Hickman... for there the information sought
was in the trial notes of the opposing lawyer. They are present here because the
policy of secrecy of grand jury proceedings." Id. at 682-83.
' See, e.g., Henderson v. Southern Ry., 17 F.R.D. 349 (E.D. Tenn. 1955); Panella
v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 14 F.R.D. 196 (N.D. Ohio 1951); Newell v. Capital Transit
Co., 7 F.R.D. 732 (D.D.C. 1948); Morrone v. Southern Pac. Co., 7 F.R.D. 214
(S.D. Cal. 1947). See generally McComicx, EVIDENCE § 78, at 16x (1954).
'A court may be guided by the question of whether "the beneficial objectives of
pre-trial discovery will be achieved." Crowe v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 29 F.R.D. 148,
152 (E.D. Mich. 1961). A court may also follow Judge Kaufman's suggestion that
discovery be permitted of all relevant information, "consonant with fairness, economy
and expedition." Kaufman, supra note 14, at 115.
22 See, e.g., Parla v. Matson Nay. Co., 28 F.R.D. 348, 349 (S.D.N.Y. 196);
United Air Lines, Inc. v. United States, x86 F. Supp. 824, 826 (D. Del. 196o ) ; Brown
v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 17 F.R.D. 324, 325 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); Brauner v.
[Vol. t962: 572
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either to establish a groundwork for impeachment 3 or to find leads to
admissible evidence, those courts favoring disclosure have also recog-
nized that first-impression, factual observations are often more revealing
and useful than statements taken at some later time, when memory has
dimmed or been distorted by "outside influences.1
24
Following this liberal approach, the trial court in Guilford attached
no crucial significance to the failure of the plaintiff's attorney to make
an independent effort. Rather, the court pointed out that depositions
taken at the time of the motion would give no assurance that the same
version of the accident was available to both parties.2 5  The Fourth
Circuit, however, took the view that "substantial" duplication by dep-
osition was probably still possible. 8 The lack of independent effort
by plaintiff's attorney was therefore significant.
In denying discovery in Guilford, the Court of Appeals was
basically concerned with the dangers of unbridled discovery under rule
34. It therefore de-emphasized the special problems involved in
duplicating first-impression statements of witnesses who are employees
of the opposing party. District courts, on the other hand, have gen-
erally been more sensitive to the employee-witness problem. Some
have gone so far as to presume hostility or incomplete, guarded
answers.2 8 Other courts have recognized that the employer's control
United States, io F.R.D. 468, 471 (E.D. Pa. 1950), rev'd on other grounds sub nom.
United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
28 This purpose is a legitimate discovery objective. 4 MooRE 34.1o, at 246o-61.
"See, e.g., California v. United States, 27 F.R.D. 261, 262 (N.D. Cal. 196i);
Herbst v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. R.R., io F.R.D. 14, I8 (S.D. Iowa 295o ) ; McCo-micK,
EVIDENCE § 34, at 64 n.x2, § 39, at 75 (1954).
25 24 F.R.D. at 499. Accord, Pennsylvania R.R. v. Julian, o F.R.D. 452, 453
(D. Del. 1950).
28 297 F.2d at 927. This view could have been based on the premise that the
substance of later statements would be just as revealing and useful as the earlier state-
ments. See Hudalla v. Chicago, M. St. P. & P.R.R., xo F.R.D. 363 (D. Minn. 295o ) ;
but see note 25 supra. This view could also have been based on the idea that the
preservation of the adversary system had a higher priority than furnishing the best
available information. See McSparren v. Bethlehem-Cuba Iron Mines Co., 26 F.R.D.
619, 621 (E.D. Pa. 296o); Helverson v. J. J. Newberry Co., 16 F.R.D. 330, 335
(W.D. Mo. 1954); Speck, The Use of Discovery in United States District Courts, 6o
YALE L.J. 1232, 1155 (1950)
" See, e.g., Sachse v. W. T. Grant Co., 27 F.R.D. 392 (D. Conn. z961 ) ; Brown v.
New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 27 F.R.D. 324 (S.D.N.Y. 2955); Brookshire v. Pennsyl-
vania R.R., 14 F.R.D. 154 (N.D. Ohio 1953).
2" Crowe v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 29 F.R.D. 248, 149, 151 (E.D. Mich. 196i)
(impliedly accepting moving party's contention that experience warrants assumption
that train crew will be antagonistic and guarded in statements)5 Henderson v.
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over the -taking of the initial statements often precludes an equal
opportunity to duplicate them at a later time." Thus, in these cases,
an absence of independent effort has been no bar to discovery under
rule 34. However, many courts, including the Court of Appeals in
the Guilford case, still require some specific showing of hostility or
unavailability. In these forums a showing of some diligent, but
unproductive effort has been a prerequisite to inspection."
Although a primary function of appellate review is to establish the
legal boundaries within which a trial judge must exercise his power,
an aim of the federal discovery rules is to maximize trial judge dis-
cretion.31 If an appellate court recognizes this goal, it will, by exercising
self-restraint, reduce the scope of its own policy-making power and
thereby increase that of the trial court.3 2  Consequently, the trial court
Southern Ry., 17 F.R.D. 349, 352 (E.D. Tenn. 1955) (safe to say parties would not
remember); Herbst v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. R. R., xo F.R.D. 14, 18 (S.D. Iowa
1950) (memories of witnesses necessarily dimmed with reference to specific details).
"See, e.g., California v. United States, 27 F.R.D. 261, 262 (N.D. Cal. i96t);
Cairns v. Chicago Express, Inc., 25 F.R.D. 169 (N.D. Ohio 196o ) ; Henderson v.
Southern Ry., supra note z$; Bennett v. New York Cent. R.R., 9 F.R.D. 17
(W.D.N.Y. 1949). Compare United Air Lines, Inc. v. United States, 26 F.R.D. 213,
2I8 (D. Del. 196o) (equal opportunity to view wreckage); United States v. Great
No. Ry., iS F.R.D. 357 (N.D. Cal. 1955) (had ample opportunity to take photos of
own right of way); Scourtes v. Fred. W. Albrecht Grocery Co., 15 F.R.D. 55 (N.D.
Ohio 1953) (plaintiff represented by counsel before desired statements taken); Lester
v. Isbrandtsen Co., zo F.R.D. 338 (S.D. Tex. 195o) (labor union member has equal
if not greater access to union member witnesses than insurance company).
"According to the Court of Appeals in Guilford, the plaintiff was in no position
"to say that the employees were reluctant to speak freely ... or were openly hostile .... "
since its representative had not actually spoken with them. 297 F.2d at 926. Accord,
McSparren v. Bethlehem-Cuba Iron Mines Co., 26 F.R.D. 619 (E.D. Pa. 196o);
Richards v. Maine Cent. R.R., 21 F.R.D. 595 (D. Me. 1957); Tandy & Allen Constr.
Co. v. Peerless Casualty Co., 2o F.R.D. 223 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); Thompson v. Hoitsma,
19 F.R.D. 112 (D.NJ. 1956) ; Grogan v. Pennsylvania R.R., x F.R.D. 342 (W.D.N.Y.
1951).
"See 2A BAR.ON & HOLrZOFF § 803, at 471-72; 4 MooRn 26.23[8], at 1133.
As to the effect of over-active appellate review on the public's confidence in trial court
action, see Wright, The Doubtful Omniscience of Appellate Courts, 41 MINN. L. REv.
751, 779-81 0I957)-
"2This self-restaint is illustrated by a refusal to upset a trial judge's discretion
unless the opposing party's rights have been "substantially and improvidently affected."
See, e.g., Bell v. Swift & Co., 283 F.2d 407 (Sth Cir. i96o) ; Roebling v. Anderson,
257 F.2d 61S (D.C. Cir. 1958); Carter v. Baltimore & O.R.R., i5z F.2d zig (D.C.
Cir. 1945).
On the other hand, the Guilford Court of Appeals found that the trial court had
"exceeded permissible bounds" in granting the production order, even though, in almost
the same breath, it recognized that the 'primary responsibility for the administration
of Rule 34 is upon the trial judge." 297 F.2d at 925-26.
[Vql. x96z: 572
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would be allowed to determine whether an independent effort to obtain
one's own information is necessarily required in every instance. More-
over, the trial court is in a better position to decide whether there has
been an adequate or equal opportunity to gather the most reliable and
useful evidence, because it is more familiar with the employee-witness
problem in both the pre-trial and trial setting. Thus it can more
accurately weigh the interests served by disclosure against the interests
served by suppression3
In considering the circumstances under which the plaintiff's attorney
was retained in Guidford,4 the Court of Appeals seemed too impressed
by the attorney's foregone opportunity to obtain written witness state-
ments shortly after the accident.35  Since the value of even "sub-
stantially" duplicated statements made a year after the accident is ques-
tionable, the practical effect of the decision is to penalize the plaintiff
for its lawyer's failure to obtain written statements at an earlier time.
True, an attorney's unjustified procrastination should be discouraged.3
" For situations comparable to Guilford in which the moving party was also de-
prived of its own eyewitness to the accident, see Crowe v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 29
F.R.D. 148 (E.D. Mich. 196i)i Brookshire v. Pennsylvania R.R., 14 F.R.D. ;54
(N.D. Ohio 1953); Hesch v. Erie R.R., 14 F.R.D. 518 (N.D. Ohio 195z).
In Bifferato v. States Marine Corp., ii F.R.D. 44 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), Judge Weinfeld
recognized that he might be rewarding non-diligence by granting discovery, but felt
that the denial of the motion would unduly penalize the moving party, who was im-
poverished and had been given trial preference. See Frost, supra note 9, at 97.
"Three days after the accident, the attorneys were called by a friend of the
decedent's family. The following day the attorneys were informed that appointed
administrator, the Guilford National Bank, intended to appoint another firm to repre-
sent the estate. The next day, however, after several conferences, it was agreed that
the attorneys first selected by the family friend would represent the estate as to the
damage claim against the Southern Railway. Within the next four days the attorneys
inspected the wrecked car, surveyed the accident scene and spoke to residents in the
area and police. The tentative retainer was not officially confirmed until two weeks
later. Brief for Appellant, pp. Ai2-14 .
"s The Guilford decision did not have to pass directly on this question since the
witnesses were apparently still available. If, however, they were no longer available,
a different and more diffciult question would have been presented.
As to how some courts have treated present unavailability of witnesses, compare
Cairns v. Chicago Express, Inc., 25 F.R.D. 169 (N.D. Ohio 196o) and Bifferato v.
States Marine Corp., xi F.R.D. 44 (S.D.N.Y. 195i) (no bar to discovery), .with
Grogan v. Pennsylvania R.R., i F.R.D. 342 (W.D.N.Y. 1951) and Lester v. Isbrandt-
sen Co., so F.R.D. 338 (S.D. Tex. 195o) and Berger v. Central Vermont Ry., 8 F.R.D.
419 (D. Mass. 1948) (discovery denied).
"It has been suggested that if the failure to make an independent effort is to be
discouraged or punished, when the future unavailability of factual material was reason-
ably foreseeable at an earlier time, some penalty other than non-discovery should be
imposed. Taxing attorney's fees to the party or to his lawyer through rules 3o(b) or
Vol. x96a: 57i]
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It is the trial court, however, that is in a better position to determine
whether the attorney has been acting negligently or in bad faith. 7
If the trial court finds that diligence would have been of little useful
value, it will neither reward nor encourage procrastination by allowing
discovery, and hence no damage to the adversary system would result.3 8
In considering the scope of rule 34, most courts of appeals have
concluded that the dangers of liberal discovery and the gains from a
general rule which promotes independent effort outweigh the extra
expenditures of time and money that this effort necessarily entails.
The Fourth Circuit has now adopted this policy choice. No doubt
decisions such as Guilford encourage a party to take written witness
statements whenever he has the opportunity. 39 This position also
37(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is one possibility. Developments, supra
note 5, at 1035-36.
"As to the judicial treatment of negligence, see United States v. Great No. Ry., is
F.R.D. 357 (N.D. Cal. 1955). As to the effect of good and bad faith, compare
Houdry Process Corp. v. Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co., 24 F.R.D. 58 (S.D.N.Y. x959)
and Thomas v. Pennsylvania R.R., 7 F.R.D. 6io (E.D.N.Y. 1947) (good faith), with
McCaffrey v. United States, 13 F.R.D. 5x2 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) and Goldbloss v. Reimann,
55 F. Supp. 8xi (S.D.N.Y. 1943) (bad faith).
For the use of other sanction devices, see 4 MOOPE 30.15, at zo41; Kaufman,
supra note 14, at 1215 Wright, supra note 3, at 781-82.
"See Developments, supra note 5, at 1029, 1035.
"If both parties are able to interview an equally co-operative witness at about
the same time, they are both likely to obtain the same factual quality of information.
The usual situation, however, is that one party has had a time and access advantage
over the other, who may still take depositions, but who will no doubt still try, as a
tactical objective, to discover the earlier statements taken by his adversary. In some
cases this independent effort has paid off, as it indicates to a court that inspection is
the only effective way in which the moving party can adequately prepare his case.
E.g., Mitchell v. Bass, 252 F.2d 513 (8th Cir. 1958); Sachse v. W. T. Grant Co., 27
F.R.D. 392 (D. Conn. 1961 ) 5 Marks v. Gas Serv. Co., x68 F. Supp. 487 (W.D. Mo.
1958); Roach v. Boston Tow Boat Co., 19 F.R.D. 267 (D. Mass. 1956); Tannenbaum
v. Walker, 16 F.R.D. 570 (E.D. Pa. 1954).
On the other hand, the effort may preclude inspection if the court finds that the
information has been now supplied, e.g., Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 509
(1947); McSparren v. Bethlehem-Cuba Iron Mines Co., 26 F.R.D. 619 (E.D. Pa.
.596o); Helverson v. J. J. Newberry Co., 16 F.R.D. 330 (W.D. Mo. 1954); Mc-
Caffrey v. United States, 13 F.R.D. 51z (S.D.N.Y. 1952), or that there is no need
to go beyond depositions and interrogatories unless special circumstances are present,
e.g., Endte v. Hermes Export Corp., 2o F.R.D. x6± (S.D.N.Y. 1957); United States
v. Great No. Ry., 18 F.R.D. 357 (N.D. Cal. 1955). But see United States v. National
Steel Corp., 26 F.R.D. 603 (S.D. Tex. i96o) (discovery remedies are cumulative, not
alternative). Inconsistencies between statements may also fail to sway the court.
E.g., Hauger v. Chicago, R.I. & P.R.R., 216 F.±d 501 (7 th Cir. 1954). A court can
examine the depositions to see whether the testimony was in fact guarded and evasive
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avoids a potential danger that "accident-prone" industries such as com-
mon carriers would institute "selective," fact-omitting investigation
techniques designed to keep prejudicial information from falling into
the hands of a suing party on a mere showing of "relevancy." 4  Fur-
thermore, such decisions facilitate a uniform administration of rule 34,
as they give trial judges a standard for determining "good cause."
The major thrust of the Guilford decision is to promote diligent,
independent effort, on the assumption that it will produce information
as useful as the desired statements in Southern's possession. It is
questionable, however, whether the Guilford circumstances warranted
this assumption and hence the belief that independent effort would
have been productive. A more acceptable decision, consistent with the
aim of the federal discovery rules to maximize pre-trial disclosure,
could have been reached if the Fourth Circuit had upheld the contempt
order. The court could have rejected the "relevancy will suffice"
standard, while still recognizing that "special circumstances" had been
sufficiently shown without any specific evidence of a frustrated, inde-
pendent effort. By adopting this modified "special circumstances" test,
the court would have given prospective notice to litigants that "special
circumstances" in some form, to be determined primarily by the trial
judge, would henceforth be required in the Fourth Circuit.
as the moving party contends. Watn v. Pennsylvania R.R., x9 F.R.D. 358 (E.D. Pa.
1956).
The only clue Guilford gives on this dilemma is that the circumstances would have
to indicate a "distinct and irremediable disadvantage to a party who is compelled to
rely on statements obtained by him later than those obtained by the other party . . .'
before inspection would apparently be considered. 297 F.zd at 926. Therefore, there
is no certainty in the Fourth Circuit as to whether independent effort of some sort will
definitely open the door to actual inspection, unless actual resistance is encountered.
40 See Frost, supra note 9, at 95; Developments, supra note 5, at o29.
A similar danger, involving statements taken by a lawyer himself, was recognized
in the Hickman case. 329 U.S. 495, 511 (5947)-
The 1954 proposal to delete "good cause" from rule 34, when applied to copies
of non-work product witness statements was also subject to similar criticism. Due to
difficulties of seemingly internal inconsistencies and the criticism of Professor Moore,
this proposal was rejected. See Symposium-Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, S
Nw. U.L. REV. 338, 392 (1956).
Some courts, however, have expressly rejected the self-protective fears and defenses
of "watered investigations" and have asserted that the courts, not a litigant, must
determine the propriety of disclosure. See United Air Lines, Inc. v. United States,
186 F. Supp. 824, 828 (D. Del. x96o); De Bruce v. Pennsylvania R.R., 6 F.R.D.
4.03, 406 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
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